Introduction
In his recent contributions to the theory of justice, Amartya Sen (2009) We argue that both Smith and Hegel adopt an essentially modern attitude in aiming at a nonfoundationalist internal analysis and normative justification of ethical norms. This is the context where the relationship between the two thinkers becomes highly relevant for contemporary discussions about ethics, which recurrently raises the issue of universalization of ethical values and norms. Given the fact that epistemologically, ethical norms can only be approached from an internal standpoint, how can we justify cosmopolitanism, i.e. the universalization of certain values? This is the problem that we wish to tackle in this paper.
Sen's focal theoretical issue is how to evaluate institutions in terms of justice. The central problem emerging from Sen's appropriation of Smithian thinking is how to make the overcoming of so-called Kantian transcendental institutionalism empirically and pragmatically feasible by means of realization-focused comparisons. This juxtaposition directly suggests the question whether Hegel's alternative to Kant, which is based on historical-evolutionary conceptualizations of institutional change, can offer a workable solution to two difficulties that result from the Smithian approach.
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Frankfurt School of Finance & Management Working Paper No. 193 We think that the Hegelian perspective, especially his emphasis on the role of estates and associations in the "ethical life", may solve the problem with Sen's conviction that democracy as such contributes to the realisation of both individual freedom and justice. If one conceives of society as a complex structure of interacting groups that offers the framework for the emergence of specific values and moral commitments, we can envisage a procedure for weighting and aggregating societal concerns via the focus on inter-group externalities. This, in turn, is related with the emergence of the market of the civil society. It is essential to realize that this view only becomes valid if it is interpreted in evolutionary terms, which establishes an important congruence between Smith and Hegel: the norms of morality emerge from the coevolution of individual behavioral standards and institutions. In this perspective, the WoN is basically an historical account of the emergence of the modern economy, and Hegel's Philosophy of Right is interpreted as a systematic analysis of the conceptual changes that are expressed in this evolution. Both approaches are non-Kantian in one particular sense, namely that even the fundamentals of ethics are internal to a specific historical and social setting. This is exactly the view that also underlies Sen's realization focused comparisons, but Sen does not offer a way how to achieve a concrete and workable universalism, which is clearly Hegel's aim.
Our analysis is Hegelian, but does not take Hegel literally. This is most evident from the fact that Hegel's view of institutional evolution is itself bound to historically and territorially contingent values, which are expressed in his ideal of the protestant constitutional monarchy as the ultimate framework for civil society. Yet, we do not think that this observation invalidates the general principles of Hegelian non-foundationalism. As we shall see, the solution to this problem can be found in considering one idea that has been proposed by Sen (2007) (Priddat 1990 ). Thus, the notion of division of labour was less seen as an economic concept, but mostly put into the context of the analysis of civil society as a body politic, which renders his approach Aristotelian in a most general sense.
The mutual dependence of individuals in the division of labour, who exchange the fruits of their labour and therefore mutually recognize the value of their alienated products, is Hegel's central illustration of the more fundamental ethical principles of the civil society in which individual freedom is based on mutual recognition. Therefore, Hegel's reading of Smith is mainly a philosophical one, in the sense of ethics and politics, and less an economic one. This also refers to Hegel's conclusions about the limits of government intervention, where he clearly follows Smith, and not Steuart (Henderson and Davis 1991: 197 Hegel thus adopts Smith's internal standpoint: sympathy is transformed into recognition (as a mechanism of socially constructed moral sentiments). Whereas in Smith this is based on a particular sort of sentiment, namely sympathy, Hegel bases the notion of recognition on the famous analysis of the logical impossibility in getting recognition for oneself without recognizing the others: That being said, his analysis of the lord and bondsman relationship remains an immensely emotional process, i.e. a 'struggle to death'.
In this context, it is important to notice that the notion of self-interest in WoN is actually in harmony with the TMS as has been argued convincingly by Mehta (2006) and in a way that the family resemblance with Hegel is most obvious. Self-interest is emphasized in the WoN for the only reason that in a market society, self-interest is the most generalizable motivation that applies for all possible kinds of interactions, and self-interest is also the position that the Impartial Spectator might identify as that position that is most justified to evaluate the actions taken in these contexts. Smith clearly states this not even as a natural principle, but as an approach that only emerges during the evolution of civil society. In other, Hegelian words, the concept of recognition would imply that the notion of self-interest as a general human motivation does only apply in the sense that within a certain institutional context, namely that of a marketplace, the only motivation that can be reasonably recognized mutually by everybody, and hence therefore achieves universal status, can be self-interest (compare Neuhouser 2008: 225). But this does not imply that self-interest is a universal human motivation in any other kind of institutional context, and cannot be seen as a human universal in the sense of presocietal natural drives and needs. This means -and it could be regarded as a genuine Hegelian lesson -that the idea of universality in the moral reflection has to undergo profound changes.
Abstract universals like concepts of a 'human nature' or 'perfect duty' should be replaced by a 'true', concrete universality that is gained from institutional embeddedness, evolves over time and is the result of a historical development.
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Hume, see Broadie 2006) and that Smith's moral philosophy, however abstract it may seem, is also deeply rooted in idea of the social interaction (Griswold 1999 of this progress should be of no interest and ought not to be sought because it leads to contradictionscontradictions lying in a task which is both to remain a task and which is yet to be fulfilled, and in a morality which is not any more supposed to be consciousness and not any more supposed to be actual.(Par.
603, see Pinkard 2010) For Hegel, therefore, Kantian duty remains an unsatisfactory moral conception since actual consciousness is per definitionem imperfect. Were the perfect duty to be realized, the consciousness as such would become redundant. That is why Hegel thinks that Kantian ideal should remain infeasible and as such an "absolute task" that, however, still asserts itself as a task. It is also too formal, too abstract (in a 'bad' sense, namely partial and thus inferior, see
Hegel's pamphlet 'Who thinks abstractly?') and void of any grounding, be it in sensibility (and here Hegel could have meant Smith as well) or in a social milieu. Sen argues that Smith's figure of the Impartial Observer is a viable alternative to contractarian approaches because it includes the opinions of non-members or bystanders in the evaluation of an institution. This is not the place to delve into the details of the Smithian notion. Suffice to state that the Impartial Spectator is a hypothetical position that emerges from the consideration of all possible perspectives of different individuals who would be imagined to be affected by a particular institution, and whose resulting states would be compared relative to the imagined state of the individual who refers to that position. So, the Impartial Spectator is an ethical position that is adopted by a single individual independent from a contractarian event. This capability to ethical reasoning is based on the universal human property of sympathy, which stays at the heart of the TMS. Sympathy is an intellectual capacity to imagine oneself in the position of another person, without implicating that the resulting evaluations are one's own, but of the other. Thus, sympathy can be the foundation of a moral calculus in which the reflecting person is able to compare and balance the evaluations of different individuals in an imagined situation. This ethical evaluation is also independent from even an imagined contractarian agreement, because it is entirely done within one individual. This discussion of Smith straightforwardly exposes the weak points in Sen's adoption of the figure of the Impartial Spectator. There are two main elements in Sen's approach to Justice which are intended to render this notion viable. The first is to refer it to the concept of democracy, the second is to introduce a specific approach to benchmarking, which is the capability approach. Both go beyond the original Smithian framework.
Regarding the first, the relevant feature of democracy cannot lie in institutional arrangements that refer to given communities, as this would resuscitate the closure of membership. So, Sen focuses on public debate, which can be open by definition, because in principle, anybody can contribute, and anybody can introduce perspectives that refer to outsiders. Thus, the Impartial
Spectator is actually bound to the notion of a universal community of participants of a global discourse, which in practice is shaped by the emergence of global news agencies, NGOs or public fora of debate such as the manifold of organizations linked with the UN. Clearly, this construct does not guarantee impartiality as a real-world phenomenon, because the scope and depth of participation in these public discourses is limited. Therefore, the connex can only be established as a future goal, thus suggesting that there is a necessary trend towards impartiality emerging. This results into a problematic complex relationship between public discourse and the idea of realization focused comparisons: In order to implement a particular comparison, one would also need to assess the current status of the realized structures of public discourse, which is an institutional phenomenon on its own sake. For the latter, a realizationfocused comparison would be necessary, too, which results into the dilemma of self-reference.
For any sort of institutional change, one would need to apply the criterion of realization focused comparisons on the level of the action outcomes and on the level of the public discourse. For example, there might be the possibility that an improvement of action outcomes may occur together with a reduction of the inclusiveness of the public discourse over it (for example, many central banks are intentionally sheltered from the impact of public opinion, which was perceived as an improvement at the time when these institutions were set up).
So, there is no wonder that Sen moves on to the second element of his theory of justice, which is the capability approach. this is what can be called a naturalistic approach to ethics, in the sense that ethical judgments flow out from human nature as expressing itself in concrete historical and cultural contexts.
Hegel may be right in believing that Smith is lacking a rigorous philosophical analysis of this phenomenon, but the basic stance is very similar. This goes back to the shared view that human sociality is essential to achieve a proper understanding of one's own self. Smith's general notion of the Spectator relates to Hegel's argument that the realization of one's own individuality and individual freedom is essentially dependent on the recognition by the other, as epitomized in the famous lord and bondsman dialectic (Redding 2008) . This is based on the need to express oneself, which in turn is impossible without relying on the resources of sociality, such as language. Language is a collectively shared resource, which presupposes the mutual recognition of meanings, without which individual expression is meaningless, even to the individual herself. So, Hegel adds two important notions to Sen's concept of public discourse. The first is to make the role of reasons more explicit, in an evolving intellectual space that is demarcated by language. Reasons always presuppose the possibility that others might not agree with one's reasons. Thus, a reason that gives full meaning to one's own actions must be a reason that at least in principle could be accepted by others. This is the specific mechanism how the position of the Impartial Spectator can emerge, and it puts fundamental limits to any sort of purely conventionalist reasoning. This is because a purely conventionalist reason can never be ac- This is an important amendment to Sen's treatment of public discourse, and at the same time offers the solution to the tension between universalism and conventionalist ethics in Smith.
The core notion is that of identity in the context of functional groupings in the civil society. In a down to earth fashion, this is the identity of individuals in different professional contexts, the workers, the lawyers or the entrepreneurs. In Hegel's original approach, these ideas are presented in a historically contingent way which certainly cannot be transferred to the present, This passage nicely illustrates not only the political importance of associational structure, but also the idea that this structure gives the morality its genuinely universal character. And we 
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Whatever is to achieve recognition today no longer achieves it by force, and only to a small extent through habit and custom, but mainly through insight and reasoned argument. (Hegel 1991, 353 , Par.
316, addition)
So, we propose that the solution to Sen's problem lies in the connection between associations and public discourse that was proposed by Hegel. This is rooted in the notion of recognition.
Within the reach of the associations, members engage in a much more intensive and detailed process of mutual recognition, which, according to Hegel, imbues them with a sense of hon- 5 Groups, society at large and evolution towards cosmopolitanism
We will now generalize this analysis by means of introducing a few terms which reflect the modern debate, but are tightly connected to Hegel's ideas. We think that the comparison of Smith, Hegel and Sen results into an important theoretical insight into the problem of assessing institutions against the background of the requirement of universalism. This is that the civil society rests fundamentally on the interplay between groups and society or markets. The key notion is that of individual identity.
In his own treatment of the identity issue, Sen emphasizes the multiplicity of modern identities and the possibility of free individual choice of multiple identities (Sen 2007 ). However, this approach overlooks the tight commitments that result even from choosing one's identity.
Even though that might be possible under certain circumstances, once the identity is settled, commitments become their defining feature: personal identities are individual deontologies.
This is exactly what Hegel refers to in his thinking about freedom: An identity can only become an identity if there is a source of absolutely binding commitments. This is epitomized in the transition from 'I' to 'we'.
The collective nature of identity has been scrutinized in different recent economic approaches to identity. Ultimately, this rests upon the role of language in fixing one's identity (Ross 2007 ). Firstly, identity may be conceived of as social identity, which builds on collectively shared conceptual classifications which cannot be completely cast into doubt, unless giving up the possibility of localize oneself in a social context (which is the Akerlof and Kranton 2000 approach). The other is that personal identity rests upon a narrative structure that defines an individual history, which in turn creates commitments underlying the generic social process of communication (Davis 2003 (Davis , 2008 . In both senses, individual identities refer to a 'we' which implies the sharing of commitments in a reference group.
Thus, we think that for establishing the ethical basis for institutional judgments identity is a crucial concern. There are two aspects here. One is that institutions need to be tied to identi-Frankfurt School of Finance & Management Working Paper No. 193 25 ties in a meaningful way, which implies that the institutions are based on mutual recognition.
Take, for example, the recent political debates over the remuneration of managers. This is related to the social identity of a particular group in society which has created certain institutionalized patterns of behavior, such as the internally accepted rules for determining managerial compensations. For the majority of managers, these are the rules that partly define their identity. However, because the increasing gap between managerial compensation and average wages in society there is a public debate in which many sides find those compensations 'unreasonable', which means that there is no convincing reason given for the extent of the gap.
This amounts to a questioning of the identity of that group, which would need to offer either good reasons or a change of the institutionalized pattern in order to fend public criticism off.
This kind of reasoning among groups help resolve a problem addressed by Griswold (1999, 95-99) : there may be certain groups that demand sympathy and recognition but deny any un- We think that this approach can close the gap in Sen between public debate and the capability approach. The point is that the universalism of civil society rests upon the marketplace, thus vindicating Smith's original idea of commercial cosmopolitanism. But this is based on a functional division of labour which is reflected in the group structure of society. This approach is not entirely new, to a certain extent, as it is also inhering the standard interest group notion in political economy. However, the interest group notion is based on shared interests, not on shared identities. In our approach, interest groups might reflect the more basic structuration principle of shared identities. Shared identities provide the foundation of ethical principles in the civil society.
Thus, we can qualify Sen's public discourse in Hegelian terms as follows. In public discourse over institutions, there can be different layers of generality. Some institutions might only be discussed within the circle of individuals sharing the identity which is partly defined by following that institution. In that case, the reasons given for the preferability of the institution are Sen stands in the tradition of social choice, but achieved to overcome the severe conceptual limitations of the focus on rational self-interest. However, to some extent he cannot fully abandon this tradition because he takes freedom as an exogenous condition for justifying ethical and political propositions. We believe that some of the limitations and inconsistencies in his approach go back to this conceptual tension.
We have shown in our paper that the study of the relationship between Smith and Hegel can 
